In the wake of the financial crisis, several countries are to ban commission payments to improve the quality of financial advice. This paper investigates the potential impact of commission bans on the source and quality of financial advice. To this end, we extend Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012) framework by allowing for both direct and intermediary advice. Our extended model has a unique separating equilibrium where customers that are naïve about conflicts of interests prefer direct advice to intermediary advice, though the latter is of better quality. Alert customers rationally prefer intermediary advice. Accordingly, the welfare benefits from commissions bans may be limited in practice.
Introduction
Sound financial advice is key to the well-functioning of financial markets. Financial decisions tend to be complex and errors can have serious consequences. Retail customers find it particularly hard to evaluate financial products. They therefore tend to rely on expert advice when making financial decisions. 1 Unfortunately, as the quote of Lord Turner highlights, expert advice has not prevented waves of mis-selling in retail financial services. In light of this, several countries have recently adopted laws to improve the quality of financial advice. Notably, as from 2013, independent financial advisers in Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are prohibited to accept commissions from financial institutions. 2 At the European level, the European Commission has proposed to ban inducements in the context of the review of the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (European Commission 2011) and the Insurance
Mediation Directive (European Commission 2012). With a ban on commissions, financial advisers are remunerated directly by their customers, through an hourly or fixed fee. It is envisaged that fee-based remuneration will lead to more suitable advice, as there is no incentive to advise a particular, high commission product. This paper investigates the source and quality of financial advice when commission payments are prohibited. To this end, we extend the Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) framework by also allowing for direct advice by financial institutions. In an innovative article, Inderst and Ottaviani show why specialized financial advisers (henceforth intermediaries) are commonly remunerated through commissions rather than through fees. Commission-based remuneration enables financial institutions to benefit more from so-called naïve customers that do not properly take into account the incentives behind advice. Since commissions undermine the 1 According to a survey by Hung et al. (2008) , over seventy percent of US retail investors consult an adviser before buying shares. Chater, Huck, and Inderst (2010) survey recent buyers of financial products across eight EU countries and find that almost sixty percent were strongly influenced by an adviser before buying shares. 2 While these countries are all implementing commissions bans for retail financial products, there are differences. In Australia, the ban is expected to hold for superannuation and investment products, and not for pure protection products and mortgages. Moreover, the ban will commence on 1 July 2012, yet compliance will be mandatory only from 1 July 2013 (Commonwealth Treasury 2012) . In the Netherlands, the commission ban will hold for complex financial products, such as mortgages, life insurance, funeral insurance and disability insurance. Other insurance products are outside the scope of the commission ban (Minister van Financiën 2011) . In the United Kingdom, the commission ban is expected to hold for advised sales, not for non-advised sales. Protection-only insurance products, e.g. mortality insurance and property and casualty insurance, and mortgages are currently outside the scope of the commission ban (Financial Services Authority 2009). quality of financial advice and are therefore detrimental to consumer surplus and welfare, the authors conclude there is an economic rationale for commission bans. We show that even with commission bans, financial institutions can take advantage of naïve customers, namely by providing direct advice. Given that direct advice is common in retail financial services, there is a clear risk that the quality of financial advice remains substandard in practice.
In our model there are two types of advisers: a financial institution and an intermediary.
While advice is non-verifiable, advisers incur costs in case of unsuitable advice. These costs may be interpreted as reputational costs, yet we assume, for concreteness, that these represent regulatory fines. In terms of remuneration, we specify that intermediaries are remunerated through fees, as our analysis focuses on financial advice when commissions are prohibited.
Besides conditional payments, fixed transfers between the financial institution and the intermediary are also prohibited. The financial institution and the intermediary operate at arm's length, which is different from Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012) baseline model, where these parties cooperate and maximize joint profits. The model treats financial products as experience goods, since customers sooner or later find out whether they have bought the right product or not. Ex ante, however, customers are unaware which product is most suitable. Moreover, customers differ in their understanding of incentives that advisers have. While alert customers understand that the financial institution has an incentive to recommend the most profitable product, naïve customers believe that profitability does not play a role and that financial advice is always balanced.
By way of preview, our main findings are as follows. In equilibrium, financial institutions find it optimal to sell to alert customers via intermediaries, and to naïve customers directly. As profit maximization implies that direct advice is tilted to the most profitable products, naïve customers unfortunately receive distorted advice. The root cause of this inefficient market outcome is that naïve customers mistakenly believe that the quality of direct advice is equivalent to that of intermediary advice. This misunderstanding of advice incentives makes it more profitable to financial institutions to deal with naïve customers directly. Alert customers obtain sound advice, however, as their willingness to pay for financial products and advice depends directly on the quality of financial advice. The model's equilibrium is incentive compatible: neither alert nor naïve customers have an incentive to switch from direct to intermediary advice, or vice versa.
In terms of advice quality and overall welfare, our equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium of Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012) baseline model with commission payments and the possibility of indirect price discrimination (see Proposition 3 in their paper). The intuition behind this similarity is relatively clear when it comes to naïve customers. In our model these customers receive direct advice, which is equivalent to intermediary advice that is steered by the financial institution through commissions, as analyzed by Inderst and Ottaviani. With respect to alert customers, the correspondence is more subtle. In Inderst and Ottaviani's equilibrium, alert customers are convinced that advice is sound as they are only charged a fee for advice. By contrast, in our equilibrium, alert customers are charged both a fee for advice and a positive premium product price. Since commission payments are forbidden, alert customers rightly do not associate a positive product price with substandard advice quality.
The model's equilibrium thus depends crucially on customer rationality. An important question is then to what extent customers fail to take the incentives behind advice into account.
In a large-scale survey among recent purchasers of retail investment products in Europe, Chater, Inderst, and Huck (2010) find that the majority of respondents are unaware of potential conflicts of interest. Of the respondents who were advised directly by product provider staff, more than half perceived the advice given to be completely independent and unbiased. In a study of stock recommendations, Malmendier and Shantikumar (2007) find that small investors follow analyst recommendations literally, even though many analysts are affiliated to underwriters and thus not independent. The authors conclude that naiveté about advice distortions is a realistic explanation of this great willingness to follow advice. Similarly, Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore Information provision by product providers is also analyzed by, among others, Lewis and Sappington (1994) , Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) , Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) , and Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2010) . Of these, only Bolton et al. (2007) focus on the financial services industry. Their key finding is that competition between financial institutions can lead to full credible information provision, even with only a small reputation cost. This result is comparable to our result with alert customers, whereby in our model reliable information provision is not the result of competition but of the presence of a trustworthy intermediary. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) also analyze situations where product advice is tied to the sale, but they focus on how financial institutions can optimally compensate internal sales agents. The benefits of steep sales incentives need to be balanced with the costs, that is, expected losses from selling unsuitable products.
In addition to financial advice, this paper sheds light on distribution strategies in financial services. For example, in insurance, there are two types of distribution strategies. So-called independent-agency insurers sell via intermediaries, whereas so-called direct writers sell directly. While independent-agency insurers have higher costs, both types of insurers have coexisted in insurance markets for decades. The dominant explanation for this coexistence is that independent-agency insurers provide higher-quality services, which explains their higher costs (Berger, Cummins, and Weiss 1997) . Our analysis reveals that the choice of distribution channel may also depend on intermediaries' remuneration. When commissions are banned and intermediaries are directly remunerated by their customers, it is attractive to follow a so-called multichannel distribution strategy, that is, selling to naïve customer directly and to alert customer via an intermediary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model that allows for both direct and intermediated sales. Section 3 investigates what determines advice and how the quality of advice affects profits, consumer surplus and total welfare. To focus initially on direct sales, Section 4 examines market equilibriums without intermediary involvement. Section 5 analyses the full model, whereby the financial institution has two distribution channels to choose from: direct and intermediated sales. Section 6 gives policy implications, and Section 7 concludes the paper. Appendix A gives the proofs of the propositions in the paper. An illustration of the model without intermediary involvement is given in Appendix B.
Model outline
The model builds on Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012) baseline model. There are three strategic players: a financial institution, an intermediary and a customer. The main difference with the existing model is that we allow for two sources of financial advice: that is, both financial institutions and intermediaries advise on product suitability.
The financial institution has two financial products on offer, products A and B. These products are imperfect substitutes. Product A is a premium product that is only provided by the modeled financial institution; product B is a plain-vanilla product that is provided by many other firms and is competitively priced. For simplicity, the production costs of the two products are normalized to zero. Since B is also provided by other firms with equal cost levels, the price of B is zero. 3 The financial institution does have price-setting power over product A, however. A high price for product A raises the profitability differential between A and B, which is key to the equilibrium outcome. In the insurance domain, product A could be a unit-linked life insurance policy with interest rate guarantees included, whereas product B could be a basic fixed annuity.
The difference between A and B can also be more subtle. For example, in banking, both products could be fixed rate mortgages, yet A offers more flexibility than B in terms of monthly payments.
While the model is specifically related to financial services, the analysis of direct advice by product providers has wider applicability. Indeed, in any market where the seller has considerable informational advantage over the buyer, the seller does not only sell the product but typically also provides product advice. Examples of such markets outside financial services are consumer electronics, residential real estate and the automotive industry.
Customers
There are N customers in the market. For simplicity, and in line with the related literature, we assume that each customer buys only one product. There are two types of customers, and β.
Customers are unaware of their type, yet know that in the population a fraction is of type and 1 is of type β. For concreteness and without loss of generality we assume .
A key element of the model is match suitability. When type (β) customers buy product (B), they are matched with the product that matches their preferences and achieve high utility . On the other hand, when type (β) customers buy product B ( ), we speak of unsuitable choice, and as result customers achieve low utility . Since suitable matches lead to higher utility, we have . For further reference we define ∆ ≡ . Since customers are expected utility maximizers, they prefer over . Accordingly, products A and B are horizontally differentiated in the sense of Hotelling (1929) . At equal prices, neither A nor B is unanimously preferred by the customers. Without advice, customers make their product choice randomly and have expected utility ∆ ∆ .
Besides product preference differences, customers also vary in terms of rationality. There are alert and naïve customers. While the former are aware of possible incentives behind product advice, the latter completely ignore this possibility. Note that no assumption is made about the relationship between customer rationality and customer preferences.
Financial institution and intermediary adviser
Customers can consult the financial institution or the intermediary to obtain information on product suitability. We assume that the quality of information of both advisers is the same.
There can be a difference in advice quality, however, namely when advisers face dissimilar advice incentives. We delay a discussion of the particular incentives behind advice to Section 3.
When consulted by a customer, an adviser forms a posterior belief that the respective customer is of type , which implies a belief 1 that this customer is of type . With perfect information, is either 0 or 1, and an adviser is certain which product is optimal and which is not. With imperfect information, however, may be any value on the interval [0,1].
Consequently, an imperfectly informed adviser is never fully sure which product is most suitable. The information quality of advisers is reflected by the cumulative distribution of the posterior belief, , which is assumed to be exogenous and known to the customers. The corresponding density function is 0 for ∈ 0,1 , which implies imperfect information.
Though imperfectly informed, as a rule advisers have an informational advantage over their customers with respect to product suitability (the exception to the rule is when the posterior belief is equal to the prior, i.e. ).
Product suitability beliefs are formed in practice through customer profiling. Adviser tend to ask their clients about their objectives, income, degree of risk aversion, investment horizon, et cetera. Combining such customer information with product information gives an adviser knowledge about product suitability. For example, when the customer is highly risk-averse and needs a financial product to pay off a mortgage in thirty years' time, simple savings products are more suitable than investment products with a variable rate of return.
The financial institution has three ways to sell its products. It can sell directly without advice, sell directly with advice, and/or sell via the intermediary with advice. The first option leads to a so-called non-advised sale. 4 In the model, non-advised sales lead to zero profits, since customers a priori do not have a preference for A over B, and B is competitively priced at zero marginal costs. This implication of the model echoes Bester's (1998) result that information provision increases the market power of firms, that is to say, the ability to set prices above marginal costs. Hence, non-advised sales are typically not in the interest of the financial institution.
With advised sales, customers receive suitability advice either from the financial institution or the intermediary. In the model, both types of advisers face an direct incentive to provide suitable advice. Specifically, in case of mismatch, an adviser's pay-outs are reduced by 0 (cf. Bolton et al. 2007 ). This parameter may be interpreted as a loss of business from word-ofmouth that the adviser gives biased advice. may also be interpreted as representing regulatory fines for providing unsuitable advice to customers. For concreteness, we use the latter interpretation of , i.e. a regulatory fine in case of unsuitable choice. Note that an adviser is always fined for a mismatch, even if it is unintentional, that is, caused by imperfect information.
The financial institution's aim is to maximize its total profits. As discussed, profitability must come from advised sales. Denote the profits from direct and intermediated advised sales and , respectively. Total profits are then + . While product B's price is fixed at marginal costs, the financial institution has price-setting power over advanced product A.
Denote A's direct advised sales price , and the intermediary price . In the baseline model, the product provider provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the intermediary. As a robustness exercise, we verify our results when it is the other way around, that is, when the intermediary provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the financial institution.
The intermediary is remunerated through a fee for advice 0. This fee is directly paid by the customer. Indeed, other than in Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) , indirect compensation of the intermediary through commissions is prohibited in our model. This allows us to focus on market outcomes when commission bans are effective. The intermediary aims to maximize its profits F.
Like the financial institution, the intermediary has zero costs. Since the intermediary is directly remunerated, the quality of advice and the size of the regulatory fines do not depend on . As a result, the intermediary has an incentive to set as high as possible.
Timeline
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1, the financial institution sets product A's advised-sales prices, i.e., and . The non-advised sales price of product A is always zero.
Based on the intermediated sales price , in 2, the intermediary chooses its advisory fee .
In 3, the customer decides between non-advised sales, direct advised sales and intermediated sales. For simplicity, we do not allow for switching between these sales channels after 3. 5
When the customer opts for no advice, all payoffs are immediately realized. In this case the financial institution and the adviser earn zero profits and the customers receive payoff . In case of advised sales, however, the game proceeds. When the customer chooses for direct advice from the financial institution, in 4 the financial institution privately receives information on the customer's type, represented in the model by posterior belief q. Using this information, in 5 the financial institution recommends the customer which product to buy, A or B. In 6, the customer chooses and, subsequently, all payoffs are realized. In 3, the customer may also choose for intermediary advice, in exchange for fee . After the fee is paid, in 4, the adviser obtains information on the customer's type, represented by its posterior belief q. Using this information, the intermediary gives a product recommendation in 5. In 6, the customer chooses its product and all payoffs are realized. In line with the related literature, all players in the game are risk neutral and payoffs are not discounted. 6
Advice, profits and surplus
Advice. When the financial institution gives advice, it has a suitability concern which is captured by parameter . Choosing between products A and B, the institution advises A if The intermediary is another source of advice in the model. As a result of its direct remuneration, the intermediary provides sound advice and thus applies advice cutoff * .
After customers have received advice in 5, they may possibly deviate from the advice given in 6. We will show in Sections 4 and 5, however, that in equilibrium, customers always follow financial advice. The intuition is that prices and and fee f are chosen in such a way that customers find it optimal to receive and follow advice, as profits are made from advised sales only. In the remainder of this section, we derive equations for profits, consumer surplus and total surplus, all under the premise that product advice is followed. Again, the validity of this premise is verified in the next two sections.
Profits. Recall that profits originate from advised sales. Let be the fraction of customers that buy without advice, the fraction of customers that opt for intermediary advice, and 1 the fraction that opt for direct advice. Since unsuitable choice is minimized with * , (9) implies that total welfare is maximized when all sales are done via the intermediary, that is 1. We will show in Section 5 that in equilibrium 1.
Direct advice
As the model is quite extensive, it is useful to concentrate on direct sales first. To this end, we assume that the financial institution interacts only directly with its customers ( 0). This has the following consequences for the timing of the game. In 1, the financial institution sets just A's direct price , instead of two prices. In 2 nothing happens and in 3 the customer chooses between no advice and direct advice as 0. The equilibrium results developed in this section will be useful in Section 5, where we analyze the full model with endogenous .
Below, in 4.1, it is first assumed that all customers are alert about the incentives behind advice. Conversely, in 4.2, all customers are assumed to be naïve and believe that advice is always unbiased. Both assumptions are extreme. In the last subsection, 4.3, we allow for a mix of alert and naïve customers, which is particularly relevant when it is not possible to price discriminate between customers.
Alert customers
Alert customers understand that advice is potentially biased when one product is more profitable to the financial institution than the other. While such alertness seem to be at odds with extant empirical evidence on typical consumer behavior in financial services, as partly described in Section 1, this subsection helps to sheds light on a world wherein customers would be a relatively strong counterforce to profit-maximizing financial institutions. The next subsection shows that with naïve customers, a completely different equilibrium arises.
Naïve customers
Here we analyze market outcomes when customers are naïve in the sense that they do not recognize that a higher price for product A, and with that a greater price differential with product B, reduces the quality of advice. Appendix A gives a proof of Proposition 2. Because naïve consumers erroneously expect honest advice, they are worse off than without advice. Indeed, substituting (17) and (18) As long as advice remains informative, total welfare still increases with advice, though. Indeed, total surplus in (8) exceeds when the probability of suitable choice is more than 50%, which is the case with informative advice.
Both alert and naïve customers
Thus far we have analyzed markets with either alert or naïve customers. Suppose now that a fraction of the customers are alert, and 1 customers are naïve, and that the financial institution cannot engage in price discrimination. No price discrimination implies that in 1 the firm has to set a single direct sales price for all customers. There are two likely alternatives. The first option is to try to sell to all customers with advice, which is possible at the alert customer price as characterized in Proposition 1. Naïve customers are certainly willing to obtain advice at that price, as they believe that the expected payoff exceeds the payoff from non-advised sales. The second option is to give advice only to naïve customers, which happens when is set at the naïve customer price , . Given Proposition 2, we know that this second option leads to a higher premium product price. Total profits may be lower, however, because alert customer won't pay , ,
for A.
Equilibrium. Denote per customer profits with the alert and naïve customer price and , respectively. To guarantee firm participation, assume 0, which implies 0. Whether the alert or the naïve customer price maximizes total profits depends on the fractions of alert and naïve customers in the population. Define cutoff 0 * 1, for which it holds that 1 *
. When the fraction of alert customers becomes sufficiently large, defined by * , the financial institution finds it optimal to sell A at the alert customer price, provided that expected profits are non-negative of course. In this case the fraction of non-advised sales 0, and total profits are, by (2), (we still fix 0). On the other hand, when * , only naïve customers obtain advice. In this equilibrium, and total profits are 1 . Figure 1 shows graphically that when the fraction of alert customers * , total profits with the alert customer price equal total profits with the naïve customer price. Note that the naïve customer price is also chosen if the alert customer price leads to a negative profit margin whereas the naïve customer price is still profitable. Interestingly, when a sufficiently large fraction of the population is alert, naïve customers are protected from exploitation and achieve consumer surplus . In the next section we show that with two distribution channels, naïve customers are not protected by their alert counterparts.
Figure 1. Total profits with alert and naïve customer price
Note: and are per customers profits with product A priced at the alert and naïve customer price, respectively.
Two sources of financial advice
While Section 4 has looked exclusively at direct sales, this section explores the market outcome when intermediated sales are also allowed for. Recall that the intermediary does not produce financial products, yet advises on product suitability and distributes products to customers. The intermediary can offer product A at price , which may differ from direct advised sales price .
The adviser has the same information on product suitability as the financial institution, and also gets regulatory fine in case of unsuitable advice. Note that when the intermediary gives advice, the financial institution cannot be fined, and vice versa. As before, information is exogenously given and comes at no costs. The customer base is assumed to be heterogeneous, with a fraction alert customers, and a fraction 1 naïve customers. Since this paper is focused on market dynamics when commissions are banned, the adviser is remunerated exclusively through a fee for advice 0.
In 5.1 we explore the baseline model, where the financial institution sets its product prices first, and the other players take these prices as given. By contrast, in 5.2 we assume that the intermediary moves first and gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the financial institution.
Profits per customer

Customer base
Total profits with alert customer price Comparing (19) and (20), and noting that 0, we find that if customers opt for intermediary advice in 3, they follow advice to buy A in 6. Similarly, it can be shown that customers always follow advice to buy product B at zero costs (cf. analysis in Section 4). Hence, we conclude that intermediary advice is always followed.
The choice between direct advice and no advice has been analyzed in Section 4. Recall that for alert customers this choice is determined by participation constraint (11); for naïve customers it is determined by (16).
What remains to be investigated is the choice between direct and intermediary advice.
Naïve customers believe that the financial institution and the intermediary both use advice cutoff * . Consequently, their choice between both advisers is solely driven by product prices and , and advisory fee . Naïve customers choose direct rather than intermediary
So, if the direct advised sales price of A is sufficiently low compared to the intermediated sales price and the advisory fee, naïve customers prefer direct advice, though the advice quality is certainly lower. Whether naïve customers opt for direct advice depends also on constraint (16).
If this constraint is satisfied, naïve customers prefer direct advice to no advice, and find it optimal to follow the advice given.
Alert customers recognize that advice quality may differ between the direct and intermediary channel. They prefer intermediary to direct advice if (derivations are in Appendix
As alert customers realize that the quality of advice may differ between the two types of advisers, constraint (22) is more complex than the analogous naïve customer constraint (21).
Intuitively, when * 1/2, the quality of advice is actually the same and, consequently, (22) and (21) are alike, the only difference being the sign of the inequality. For * 1/2, the intermediary offers better advice than the financial institution. Since alert customers realize this, they are willing to pay a higher intermediated sales price than naïve customers, for given and .
This follows from a comparison of (21) and (22). Naïve customers prefer direct sales when / , while alert customers prefer intermediary advice for some / .
All in all, we have derived five customer participation constraints. Constraint (19) applies to both naïve and alert customers; (16) and (21) are applicable only to naïve customers; and (11) and (22) are applicable only to alert customers.
Intermediary and financial institution participation. Although the adviser is unbiased, it may still
give unsuitable advice as a result of imperfect information. In case of unsuitable choice, the adviser is fined by the regulator, just as the financial institution is fined when its advice is followed by unsuitable choice. In view of that, the adviser's participation constraint is . 23
A necessary condition for the financial institution to engage in intermediated sales is that the resulting profits are non-negative. Since fines are payable by the intermediary, 0 guarantees firm participation. Note that financial institution participation constraint with direct sales is (14).
Equilibrium. In 1, the financial institution sets prices and with the aim to maximize profits in (2). Recall that of the N customers, a fraction choose intermediated sales, a fraction choose non-advised sales, and all others are advised by the financial institution. Per customer profits and determine to what extent the financial institution wants to steer customers toward direct respectively intermediated sales.
It is convenient to start with an analysis of . (4) shows that increases linearly in intermediated sales price . Given participation constraints (19) and (23) (27), the intermediary sets in 2, as this is the maximum fee it can charge to its customers. In this equilibrium, by (16), (19) and (21) naïve customers choose direct advice; by (11), (19) and (22) The equilibrium in Proposition 4 is incentive compatible since neither alert nor naïve customers have an incentive to switch distribution channel. All customers have an expected surplus , yet naïve customers actual surplus is lower, and they would therefore be better off with intermediary advice. Naïve customers do not choose intermediary advice, however, because they overestimate the quality of direct advice. As a result, overall consumer surplus is below , irrespective of the fraction of alert customers . By contrast, the financial institution is possibly better off with two distribution channels. It earns total profits 1 ̅ , which exceed profits without intermediated sales when ̅ 0. There are two reasons for this. First, two distribution channels enable the financial institution to offer two contracts and (second-degree) price discriminate between alert and naïve customers. Second, with an intermediary, the financial institution is able to extract more surplus from alert customers. The intuition is that when commissions are banned, intermediaries are able to credibly promise sound financial advice, which benefits the financial institution.
How does this equilibrium compare to Inderst and Ottaviani's (2012) outcome with a heterogeneous customer base? Recall that Inderst and Ottaviani investigate intermediary advice, where the intermediary can be remunerated either indirectly, through a contingent commission, or directly, through a fee for advice. When indirect price discrimination is possible, the authors find a market equilibrium that is identical to Proposition 4 in terms of advice quality, and thus overall welfare. Alert customers receive balanced advice * , whereas advice to naïve customers is tilted towards premium product A * * ,
. When price discrimination is impossible though, the outcome of Inderst and Ottaviani's baseline model depends on the fraction of alert customers (cf. our Proposition 3). When the fraction of alert customers is sufficiently large, all customers receive sound advice. When there are a lot of naïve customers, though, alert customers acquire no advice, whereas naïve customers are exploited ( * * , ).
Robustness exercise: the intermediary moves first
We conclude this section with a variation of the baseline model. In this variation, the game starts with the intermediary setting its advisory fee f in 1. The financial institution takes f as given and sets its prices and in 2. The rest of the game remains unchanged.
Equilibrium. The intermediary sets f as high as possible and never below , as that would imply an expected loss. By participation constraint (19) we have that an increase in f decreases the intermediated sales price that intermediary customers are willing to pay. However, the intermediary does not only need participation of the customers but also of the financial institution. When it is profitable to do so, the financial institution may stop intermediated sales altogether and sell its products only directly. Choosing between a multi-channel distribution strategy and direct sales only, the financial institution prefers the former when 1 , 28
with , and as in (26), (4), and (25) Proposition 5 implies that the main results of the paper are robust to changing the sequence of the first two stages of the game. The distribution of intermediated sales profits does change, however. When the intermediary moves first and the fraction of alert customers is small, all intermediated sales profits are pocketed by the intermediary. By contrast, when there are many alert customers and 0, the financial institution also earns intermediated sales profits, even though the intermediary moves first. The intuition here is that with many alert customers, the financial has a credible threat to bypass the intermediary. As a result, the intermediary rationally shares intermediated sales profits with the financial institution.
Policy implications
As explained by Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) , there is an economic rationale for commission bans when customers do not adequately take into account the incentives behind advice. We have shown in Section 5 that such unawareness of advice incentives actually makes commission bans ineffective. When commissions are banned, financial institutions have an incentive to by-pass intermediaries and transact with naïve customers directly. To correct the potential market failure of biased direct advice, an obvious -though admittedly radical -intervention would be to prohibit direct advice altogether.
A more gradual way to mitigate the risk of advice bias would be to increase the regulatory penalty for unsuitable advice. With commissions banned, our analysis suggests that policy intervention should focus on advice by financial institutions. By (1) we have that the quality of direct advice increases in penalty . In the limit, direct advice may become fully informative , yet it is more likely that financial institutions stop providing advice altogether, as the regulatory fines become prohibitively high. In addition, to increase the probability that misconduct is quickly detected regulators could use so-called mystery shoppers. Mystery shoppers act as potential customers and allow regulators to obtain a detailed insight in how financial firms treat their consumers (Financial Services Authority 2006b).
Policy intervention could also focus on customers' awareness of conflicts of interests inherent in direct financial advice. Specifically, product advice by financial institutions may need to come with a health warning that the advice given is not independent. To be effective, such a warning needs to turn naïve customers into alert customers, which could be assessed empirically. Research in this area could be initiated by the conduct of business supervisors in the countries that are adopting commission bans, i.e. the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, and the new Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom. Note that transparency also has potential disadvantages. For example, Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) provide evidence that the disclosure of conflicts of interest may act as a moral-license for self-interested behavior.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the source and quality of financial advice when financial institutions are prohibited to induce financial advisers through commission payments. Since several large countries have recently adopted laws to ban commission-based remuneration per 2013, our analysis sheds light on the possible future of financial advice in the respective countries. The paper builds on Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) , who have developed a theoretical framework to investigate the interaction between customers, a financial adviser and a financial institution. Our extension to the existing model is that apart from the financial adviser also the financial institution can give product suitability advice. Since both types of advisers have the same informational advantage vis-à-vis the customers, they are both in a position to increase the probability of suitable choice and, therewith, to increase total surplus in the market.
Our main finding are as follows. With a ban on commissions, the financial institution finds it optimal to offer its products both directly and via an intermediary. Customers that are alert about the incentives behind advice realize that direct advice by the financial institution is of lower quality than intermediary advice. Accordingly, alert customers have a greater willingness to pay for financial products that are advised by an independent financial adviser. Naïve customers, on the other hand, are under the impression that advice is always balanced. The financial institution can benefit from this naïveté through its product pricing. Specifically, it can set its prices in such a way that naïve customers prefer direct advice to intermediary advice.
Consequently, in equilibrium, alert customers obtain balanced advice from the intermediary, whereas naïve customers receive advice directly from the financial institution, which is tilted towards the most profitable product. The market outcome thus depends crucially on customer alertness about the incentives behind advice. When a significant fraction of customers is in fact naïve about advice quality, there may be a case for policy intervention. We discuss policy suggestions to correct potential market failure, including higher regulatory fines for unsuitable advice and disclosure of conflicts of interests.
Future work could enrich our analysis by introducing competition between financial institutions and intermediaries. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) go into the effect of competition on financial advice. They show that competition does not only lead to lower product prices, it also increases the quality of advice that is given to naïve customers. Our intuition is that competition has the same effect in our model, that is, it will drive prices closer to marginal costs and therewith reduce the incentive to tilt advice to profitable products. Another possible extension of the paper is to endogenize the quality of information, where advisers incur costs to obtain information. We leave this for future research. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
It is shown in Section 4.2 that as long as customer participation (16) is satisfied, naïve customers prefer advised sales to non-advised sales, and also follow the advice given in 6.
Consequently, profits are 1 , with as in (3). Under the condition that firm participation constraint (14) holds, the financial institution also prefers advised sales to nonadvised sales and in equilibrium. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We build this proof on the result in the text that when customers opt for advice, they follow the advice given. This holds both for direct and intermediary advice. When advice is followed, the financial institution has profits 1 , with and in (3) and (4), respectively. The financial institution sets premium product prices and to maximize .
Since Proposition 4 is on condition that providing advice is profitable, that is, (14) and (23) are satisfied and 0, profit maximization excludes non-advised sales in equilibrium 0 .
The financial institution sets as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the intermediary in 1.
Provided that a non-negative intermediary sales price of product A is possible, will be set at a level that leaves the intermediary with zero profits, or, 0. By (5) Note that, irrespective of the fraction of alert customers , the intermediary sets in such a way that the financial institution prefers to transact with alert customers via the intermediary and with naïve customers directly, using direct advice cutoff * , . Hence, in terms of advice quality and source of advice, the outcome of this variation is identical to the outcome of the baseline model as characterized in Proposition 4. Q.E.D. Figure A1 shows total surplus and consumer surplus for different values of ∆ . For expositional purposes, we have set 1 , 0, and customer mass 1. Note that when ∆ increases, match suitability becomes more important to customers, and therewith to the financial institution, as it can charge a higher price for the premium product. The top panel shows that total surplus is monotonically increasing in ∆ , both with alert and naïve customers.
The kinks in the graphs can be traced back to the firm participation constraint. When it is not profitable to provide advice, the monopolist switches to execution only or leaves the market altogether. In both cases total and consumer surplus are ∆ , and producer surplus is zero. surplus with direct advice is given by 8 , and consumer surplus is given by 6 .
The lower panel shows that customers are not necessarily better off when ∆ increases.
Alert customers benefit from higher ∆ , even though advice quality deteriorates. This is because their alertness prevents the financial institution from raising product A's price too much. Naïve customers, however, are strictly worse off with advice. In fact, when ∆ 2, advice becomes completely uninformative and all consumer surplus is extracted by the financial institution.
